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For individual countries, variable trade barriers can be used to reduce the volatility of domestic relative to world prices. If this is done by countries accounting for a large share of the market, its effect is offset by increases in world price volatility. This study shows the nature of the resulting collective action problem, with the policy being ineffective on average in stabilizing domestic prices while increasing the volatility of the income transfers from terms-of-trade changes. A simple approach to assessing the contribution of insulation to the price increases is developed and used with new estimates of agricultural distortions to assess its contribution to the price spikes in This paper is a product of the Agriculture and Rural Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at wmartin1@worldbank.org.
1972-74 and 2006-08 for rice and wheat. The analysis suggests that 45 percent of the increase in rice prices in 2006-08, and 30 percent of the increase in wheat prices, was due to insulating behavior. One sign of progress since 1972-74 was a substantial reduction in the extent of price-insulating behavior by the industrial countries. This provides little stabilizing benefit in the rice market because countries not classifying themselves at the World Trade Organization as developing account for only 3 percent of world rice consumption. But it does offer some benefit for the wheat market where non-developing countries account for 27 percent of consumption.
Export Restrictions and Price Insulation during Commodity Price Booms

Will Martin and Kym Anderson
Prices of grains and other storable commodities are characterized by long periods in the doldrums, punctuated by short but intense price spikes (Deaton and Laroque 1992) . Those spikes are of concern not least because they can have large impacts on poverty in developing countries (Ivanic and Martin 2008) . Accounts of the food price spikes of 1973-74, 2006-8 and 2010-11 include discussion of a wide range of contributing factors such as exogenous shocks to supply or demand, below-trend stock levels, speculative behavior, and trade policy responses to the shock. Johnson Hochman et al. 2010; Timmer 2010; Robles, Torero and von Braun 2008) . Several suggest that export restrictions (and maybe also import subsidies) played an important role, just as intensified export subsidies and triggered import restrictions played a significant role in 1986-8 when international food prices slumped. However, we are unaware of any attempts to quantify the aggregate contribution across countries of trade policy responses to international price surges.
In this paper, we address this issue directly. Following Freund and Özden (2008) , we assume national trade policy responds to the risk of losses for significant groups by insulating the domestic market to some extent from international price fluctuations for staple foods. This is consistent with the behavior of many governments, and it provides an economic rationale for the econometric estimation of price transmission elasticities. We use a standard conceptual framework to derive a simple equation that provides at least a rough way to estimate the contribution of market-insulating policy behavior to international price spikes for homogenous farm products. We then examine evidence from two major upward price spikes (1973-4 and 2006-8) for the key commodities of wheat and rice. Policy implications are drawn out in the final section of the paper.
International Price Volatility and National Policy Responses
Consider a weather-(or financial market-) induced exogenous shock to the global market for a food staple that causes a surge in its international price. Suppose that, in response, exporting countries impose or raise an export tax or tighten export restrictions (or lower any export subsidy), and importing countries reduce their tariff or other import restrictions (or introduce or raise an import subsidy) to reduce the rise in their domestic price. If both sets of countries try to reduce the impact of the shock on domestic prices to the same extent, their attempts will be collectively futile. This is very easy to show graphically in the case where first the exporters and then the importers seek to completely block the effect of an increase in the price of food resulting from an initial shock.
For an individual small exporting country, the effect of the increase in its (explicit or implicit) export tax it is to reduce the domestic price relative to the newlyraised world price. The same effect occurs in a small importing country that reduces its (explicit or implicit) import tariff. If a sufficient number of exporting countries intervene in this way, their export restrictions cause the world price of the good to rise further, thereby reducing the impact of each country's initial action on its domestic price. This situation is depicted in Figure 1 , where the excess supply curve of the exporting country group is ES and the excess demand curve of the importing country group is ED following the exogenous shock but prior to any changes to trade restrictions. If an export tax is then applied, the world price needed to obtain any given level of exports is higher, since part of the export price is paid to the exporting government. This is reflected in the ES curve moving up to ES, 1 the effects of which are to raise the world price from P w to P w and lower the domestic price from P w to P d .
Figure 1. Key impacts of an export restriction
In the situation depicted in Figure 1 , the exporting country group gains from the improvement in their export price. However, production incentives are reduced and consumers have an incentive to increase their demand, even though export prices are higher,. The global social cost associated with these incentives is given by the triangle abc. That can be subdivided into a loss to private agents in the importing group of area bcP w 'P w , a loss to private agents in the exporting group of area baP d P w , and a gain to the government or export quota holders in the exporting country group of area acP w 'P w . Whether the exporting countries as a group enjoy a net gain from restricting exports depends on whether the upper rectangle (the terms of trade gain) is larger than the lower triangle (the social cost). Since the social costs rise with the square of the export tax equivalent (P ' w -P d ), while the terms of trade gain is likely to rise roughly linearly with the rate, the benefits to the exporter group will become negative if the export tax rate becomes sufficiently large. By contrast, importing If policy makers in importing countries were concerned primarily about the impact on their terms of trade of the imposition of export restrictions, they might respond by raising tariffs on their imports. However, during episodes of international food price spikes, the response has typically been the opposite: tariffs on food imports are reduced in an attempt to avoid adverse impacts on domestic consumers. This response reduces the cost imposed on the importing country group by its own protectionist barriers. However, it will compound the increase in world prices resulting from the initial price shock and the policy response by exporters. It will also add to the exporter group's terms-of-trade benefits resulting from the initial upward price shock and from its own imposition of export restrictions.
In Figure 2 , exporters attempt to completely offset the impact of the initial increase in the price of the good by shifting the ES curve to ES'. Importers seek to achieve the same insulation by reducing tariffs (or paying import subsidies) so as to shift the ED curve to ED'. As is evident in Figure 2 , the combined effect of these policy changes is to leave domestic prices in both importers and exporters at the postshock level P w and to raise the international price from P w ' to P w ''. Despite the attempts of both the importer and exporter country groups to fully offset the original increase in price to P w , domestic prices and quantities unchanged at their post-shock level (P 0 in the Figure) . The only effect of these policies is to compound the terms-oftrade shift against the importing country group and in favor of the exporting group, generating a transfer from the former to the latter of (P w ''-P 0 ).Q in Figure 2 (in addition to that caused by the initial exogenous shock). This is in sharp contrast with a move from autarchy towards free trade, which is able to reduce price risk through diversification of market outlets very substantially since the correlations between commodity output shocks across countries are very limited (Johnson 1975) .
Figure 2. Impacts of equal export barrier increases and import barrier reductions
Insulation generates a classic collective-action problem akin to when a crowd stands up in a stadium to get a better view: no one gets a better view by standing, but any that remain seated get a worse view. This collective action is, unfortunately, not just completely ineffective-it generates an international public 'bad' by amplifying the volatility in the world price of the product, and hence the volatility of the income transfers associated with terms-of-trade changes.
To assess the implications of price insulation on a homogenous product's international price, p * , we begin with the global market equilibrium condition:
where S i is the supply in region i; p i is the region's producer price; v i is a random production shift variable for that region; D i is demand in region i (assumed to be not subject to shocks from year to year); and P i is the consumer price in region i. We assume that p i = (1+t p ).p * where t p is the distortion rate between the producer price and international price, and that P i = (1+t c ).p * where t c is the distortion rate between the consumer price and international price. With a focus on border measures, we can use a single variable for the power of the trade tax equivalent, T = (1+t) where t = t p = t c . 
--where is the proportional change in the international price; is an exogenous stochastic shock to output such as might result from better or worse weather than average; η i is the elasticity of demand; γ i is the elasticity of supply; G i is the share at international prices of country i in global demand; and H i is the share of country i in global production. That is, the impact on the international price of a change in trade distortions in country i depends on the importance of that country in global supply and demand, as well as the responsiveness of its production and consumption to price changes in the country, as represented by γ i and η i . With large proportional changes in trade policies and other shocks, the effects are no longer purely additive as in equation (2) and we need to take into account the interaction between these two proportional changes.
A notable implication of equation (2) is that a uniform policy response by all countries ( is the same for all i) will make the elasticities of supply and demand irrelevant to the impact on international prices: if all countries alter their distortions by a uniform amount, the international price will change by an exactly-offsetting amount, leaving domestic prices unchanged.
If we assume that output cannot respond in the short run and that inventory levels are low enough that stock adjustments have limited effect, then γ i =0. If we further assume that the national elasticities of final demand for the product (η i ) are the same across countries, then equation (2) suggests we can estimate the contribution to international price changes resulting from changes in national trade policies as simply the negative of the consumption-weighted global average of the s T i ' .
Incidentally, if we consider the case where protection varies endogenously in response to changes in the international price, trade distortions are no longer an exogenous source of shocks, and international prices will change only in response to exogenous shocks such as weather-induced shocks to output. In this case, the counterpart to equation (2) These NAC estimates are reported in Table 1 for the two upward price spike periods. For each of the regions shown, as well as for the world as a whole, the patterns are strikingly similar: falls in the NAC as the international price rose. The proportional changes in NACs in the first half of each spike differ across products and country groups, however. As shown in Figure 3 , the proportional change was very similar for high-income and developing countries in the 1970s spike, albeit only half as large for wheat as for rice. In the more recent spike, the proportional change for high-income countries was somewhat smaller in the case of rice and very much smaller in the case of wheat than for developing countries.
Assuming that output was able to respond only to a limited degree in the first half of each spike, and that the national elasticities of demand (including stock demand) are similar across countries for each product, we set the γ i 's to zero and use equation (2) to estimate the contribution to international price changes of priceinsulating behavior resulting from national price-insulating policy behavior is the (negative of the) consumption-weighted global average change in the national T i 's.
For rice the cumulative decline shown in the world row of Table 1 Table 2 .
In both of these periods, export restrictions were the dominant instrument for developing countries; they became more and then less important in the upward spike period of 1972-76, and conversely in the downward spike period of 1984-88. In highincome countries there were virtually no taxes or other restrictions on exports, but export subsidies followed the same path as import tariffs over those spike periods: Ushaped during the upward spike, inverted U-shaped in the downward spike. Together these estimates suggest the experiences with rice and wheat were not inconsistent with the pattern for farm products in general, especially when bearing in mind that the NRA estimates in Table 2 include numerous nontradable products whose NRAs tend to remain close to zero and hence dampen year-to-year fluctuations in the aggregate estimates.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Trade policy The evidence in Figure 3 suggests that at least high-income countries altered their NACs less in the most recent price spike period than in the two previous ones.
That is not inconsistent with the fact that the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, which came into force with the creations of the WTO in 1995, involved commitments to bind tariffs and subsidies. Nor is the finding that developing countries are still very active users of variable border measures and especially export restrictions, given (a) that developing country bindings are well above applied rates and (b) that the WTO has no effective restrictions on agricultural export measures.
However, more-comprehensive empirical analysis over a broader range of products is needed before it would be possible to say how much of these changes can be attributed to the presence or absence of WTO disciplines.
Since bindings on import tariffs and subsidies even for many high-income countries were made at levels well above historically applied rates, plenty of 'wiggle room' for countries to raise applied rates without infringing their commitments to other WTO members remains. Furthermore, with no effective disciplines yet applying to export restrictions, the WTO membership is yet to address the other half of this beggar-thy-neighbor problem. And if a Special Safeguard Mechanism were to be introduced as part of a Doha Development Agenda agreement, the problem would be become even worse (Hertel, Martin and Leister 2010) . An obvious solution is to seek a collective agreement to limit the extent of price-insulating policy use. Perhaps the most-recent experience with price spikes in 2006-8, and again in 2010-11, will make WTO members more willing to address this issue. Source: FAOSTAT producer prices (www.fao.org) and international reference prices from the World Bank's Prospects Group (econ.worldbank.org). 
